Abstract. Floods cause damage to people, buildings and infrastructures. Water distribution systems are particularly exposed, since water treatment plants are often located next to the rivers. Failure of the system leads to both direct losses, for instance damage to equipment and pipeworks contamination, and to indirect impact, since it may lead to service disruption and thus affect population far from the event through the functional dependencies of the network. In this work, we present an 5 analysis of direct and indirect damages on a drinking water supply system, considering the hazard of riverine flooding as well as the exposure and vulnerability of active system components. The method is based on interleaving, through a semi-automated GIS procedure, a flood model and an EPANETbased pipe network model with a Pressure-Driven-Demand approach, needed when modelling water distribution networks in highly off-design conditions. Impact measures are defined and estimated so 10 as to quantify service outage and potential pipe contamination. The method is applied to the water supply system of the city of Florence, Italy, serving approximately 380 000 inhabitants. The evaluation of flood impact on the water distribution network is carried out for different events with assigned recurrence intervals. Vulnerable elements exposed to the flood are identified and analysed in order to estimate their residual functionality and to simulate failure scenarios. Results show that in the 
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Inundation model and exposure analysis
The inundation model uses a river hydrograph (either recorded or calculated for a hydro-meteorological scenario) to produce a raster map showing the representative flood parameters, in particular water 120 depth. In the literature computation is commonly performed through simplified Navier-Stokes equations with different numerical schemes and spatial resolutions of the computational domain (Hunter et al., 2008) . In particular, accurate forecast of flood propagation in urban environments usually requires 2D models with an adequate description of the street/building pattern, limiting the computational grid resolution to about 1 m (Apel et al., 2009) . In this context, the increasing availability of 125 geographic data such as LiDAR-derived Digital Terrain Models (DTM) ease the setup of the model (Fewtrell et al., 2011) . Nevertheless, some issues such as the computational effort and the definition of representative roughness coefficients still arise. As an alternative, parsimonious hydraulic models are also accepted as a compromise between accuracy and computational effort when steady state approximations and large and cumbersome computational domains are not sustainable (Apel et al., 130 2009; Arrighi et al., 2013) .
The implemented hydraulic model is comprised of two parts. Firstly, the river is represented with a 1-D unsteady flow model and the urban flood-prone area is modelled as a system of inter- banks through a set of lateral weirs, whose geometry is extracted from a topographic survey. When 140 the inundation starts, the quasi-2-D module -governed by mass conservation and stage-storage relationships -calculates water levels from the volume stored in the cell. Flow between adjacent cells is described by a weir equation accounting for backwater effects. The details of the model construct and equations adopted in the HEC-RAS framework (for both 1-D and quasi-2-D modules)
are described in Arrighi et al. (2013) . The increasing availability inundation maps from local water Exposure analysis requires matching of data from inundation maps and information on location 150 of assets, usually performed by means of Geographic Information Systems (GIS). All the components of the WDN, both active and passive must therefore be geo-referenced to be compared with inundation maps for assigned scenarios. For the risk assessment of the WDS, exposure analysis is conducted on active components based on the maximum water depth occurring during the flood event. Maximum water depth is also used to assess the potential contamination at nodes. 
Distribution Network Model
170
The model is based on the freely available EPANET libraries, which calculate time-varying pressures at the nodes given a set of initial tank levels, pump switching criteria, base nodal demands and demand patterns. In particular, EPANET can be launched by other software through a set of DLL libraries.
One drawback of the standard EPANET implementation is its strict demand-driven approach,
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which stems from the primary goal of simulating correctly operated networks. In such networks, pressure at each node is sufficient so as to allow withdrawal of required flow rate from each node, so that demands can be assumed as defined input data. However, when simulating strongly off-design networks, nodes featuring a reduced pressure are quite common, so that a pressure-driven demand approach is needed (Cheung et al., 2005; Walski et al., 2017) . PDD models differ from conventional 180 ones in that nodal demands are not attributed a priori, rather their value depends on the current local pressure. In particular, and consistently with practice, the model assumes that each node is in one of three states: fully served -if H i ≥ H service , the node is able to withdraw its nominal demand;
partially served -if H service > H i > 0, the node withdraws a reduced demand which can be ex-
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pressed as
where α is a constant exponent set to 0.5. non-served -if P = 0, the node is unable to withdraw any water, yielding null demand.
EPANET allows two types of nodes: nodes are assigned a time-varying, pressure-independent 190 demand, and can be effectively used to model fully served users, whereas emitters, conceived to model fixed cross-section water outlets such as fire hoses and orifices, adequately model the aforementioned behaviour of partially served users. Emitters are defined by a fixed exponent α, equal for all instances, and a flow coefficient which represents the volume flow rate for unitary pressure loss across the orifice. Unfortunately, emitters do not cope well with calculated negative pressures, state 2 to state 0 and vice versa). After node states have been changed, simulation is repeated till no more state change is necessary. Calculated flow rates and pressures are considered to represent network operation during the subsequent time step. In particular, flow rates are used to calculate the time to the next event (tank being filled or drained), and the first event affecting network topology 210 is considered (e.g. demand change, pump setting toggling due to time pattern, tank becoming empty or full). Tank levels are thus updated and simulation proceeds to the next time step. The described procedure allows for calculating pressure and supplied demand at each node for each time step, therefore fully estimating the network state in each moment.
Model initialisation 215
The model, featuring non memoryless elements (tanks), needs to be correctly initialised. In normal operation, tank levels undergo a daily pattern of filling and emptying, according to demands and water availability. In order to appropriately initialise tank levels, a warm-up simulation is run by randomly initialising tank levels and checking their value every 24 hours. If the calculated levels differ from those corresponding to 24 hours before by less than a tolerance parameter, the model is 220 considered to be in steady state and water level for each tank and time value are saved in a matrix, which can thereafter be used to initialise the values for the forthcoming simulations.
Definition of impact measures
Two measures have been defined in order to evaluate the global impact of the flood on network operativeness and integrity. in each area and calculated, and the number of inhabitants for each node pertaining to that area is estimated accordingly. In particular:
where P i is the population assigned to node i belonging to area A and P A is the total population of area A. The Non-Served Population (NSP) parameter is thus estimated as the total population of 235 nodes with reduced or null pressure, i.e.
where H service is the minimum head required to consider a node fully served (5.0 m in the case study).
As a second measure, network damage due to pipe contamination is evaluated by calculating the 240 total length of pipework to be decontaminated. A pipe is considered to be contaminated if at any point in time head inside the pipe is lower than the floodwater head outside or below zero, i.e.
where J i is the set of pipes with either end connected to node i.
3 Case study 245
Flood scenarios
The study area is the municipality of Florence, Italy, with an areal extent of 102 km 2 . The area hosts about 380 000 inhabitants, the highest population density being found in the city centre along the Arno river banks. Documents witness that the town has a long account of floods since the Middle Ages, as confirmed by more recent hydrologic-hydraulic studies (Caporali et al., 2005) showing that The meter-scale DTM used for the hydraulic model is freely available in the regional cartographic repository (dati.toscana.it/dataset/lidar). The hydraulic data (hydrographs and river water profiles) are made available by the catchment authority ("Autorità di Bacino del Fiume Arno"), which is in 260 charge of flood risk management and water resource planning.
Four flood scenarios with different recurrence intervals RI are considered when applying the method described in Section 2: a frequent scenario (RI = 30 years), two medium recurrence intervals (100 and 200 years) and a rare scenario (500 years). Accordingly, four inundation raster maps are generated to carry out the exposure analysis. 
Water distribution system
The studied WSS features one main treatment facility, 17 tanks and the pipeworks to supply drinking water for domestic and industrial use.
Fresh water supply is ensured by the river, which flows westbound amidst the urban area. Water is abstracted from the river by three 373-kW pumps in the treatment plant "Anconella", which is 270 located in the left bank and designed to process 4 m 3 /s (Fig. 3) . and 27 km 2 and average depths to 1.2 and 1.7 m respectively. In these scenarios the historic district is also affected (centre of Fig. 3 ) with water depth as high as 4 m. In the downstream areas water depth locally exceeds 4 m (see Fig. 4 for an example of 500-year RI inundation). Table 3 shows the results of the exposure analysis. For RI = 30 years, none of the vulnerable WSS components is affected. For RI = 100 years, the tank labelled "VCMantigna" is exposed to
flood, yet the average flood depth in a buffer zone of 25 m radius is about 0.15 m, therefore the electrical devices are assumed in operation. For RI = 200 and 500 years, the drinking water treatment plant (DWTP) at Anconella, shown in the right-hand side of Figure 3 , is flooded with a water depth 310 exceeding 0.85 m. In these scenarios, issues are expected because of drinking water treatment restrictions, loss of control and power shut-down of the lifting station. The "VCMantigna" tank is still exposed, with water depths as high as 2 m for RI = 500 years.
WDN dynamics and impact metrics
Results are shown relative to the 200-year and 500-years recurrence intervals, those for which failure 315 of the DWTP is expected. In particular, two scenarios are considered: in scenario 1, it is assumed that the DWTP completely stops providing fresh water to the system; in scenario 2, some backup system is assumed to keep one of the three main pumps feeding the network in operation.
The nodal heads 120 minutes after the lifting station failure are shown in Figure 4 Evolution of aggregate service metrics in time is calculated for the two aforementioned failure scenarios. Non Served Population is shown in the panels of Figure 5 as a fraction of total population.
In failure scenario 1 (Fig. 5, panel a) , the complete shutdown of the DTWP pumping station deprives 335 almost 50% of the population of water supply after 3 hours, consistently with the dynamics shown in Section 4.2. After six hours, such condition extends to the 70%. If also inhabitants experiencing insufficient pressure are considered, total affected population is about 90%. In failure scenario 2 (Fig. 5, panel b) , total affected population ranges from 62 to 77%. Nevertheless, inhabitants experiencing no service at all are about 15%, rising to less than 30% only after 9 h. Population not served For what concerns evaluation of network damage, the panels of Figure 6 show the length of con-345 taminated pipe as a function of time for the two studied failure scenarios. Again, scenario 1 (Fig. 6, panel a) shows a critical situation, where about 25% of the network undergoes contamination risk shortly after the shutdown and 68% of the network is out of service just six hours afterwards. In scenario 2 (Fig. 6, panel b) , the contaminated pipe length fraction rises from 9% to 26% in the first 12 hours, thus suggesting a milder impact. Nevertheless, caution must be paid for the risk of 350 Figure 4 . Inundation map for the 500-year recurrence interval and nodal heads 120 minutes after lifting station failure for scenario 1 (no pumps on) (a) and scenario 2 (one pump on) (b). Reference coordinate system is EPSG:WGS84.
backflow towards nodes which lie on the borders of the served areas. In principle, contaminated pipe length does depend of the RI considered, since higher floodwater depth leads to higher contamination risk. Nevertheless, results show that in the studied case there is little difference between the 200
and 500-year recurrence intervals.
If a pipe has been contaminated it needs to be disinfected before being put in service again. Dis- scenario 1, where no water is provided by the DWTP, the entire demand is met by withdrawing water from the tank system. This is highlighted by the average slope of the curve in the first three hours (about 0.75 m 3 /s, which corresponds to half of the total demand in normal conditions. After about 3 and 5 h, reservoir configuration changes, so that also the average slope of the volume of the tanks is affected. Slope changes in both curves are caused both by demand variations and tanks 375 Figure 7 . Volume stored in tanks as a function of time since failure being drained. In particular, the abrupt change for failure scenario 1 after about 5 h corresponds to a tank serving a great number of nodes being drained, thus corresponding in sudden change in served demand (slope). The relationship between served demand and curve slope is not so evident for failure scenario 2, since slope curve only relates to those users not directly served by the DWTP.
Sensitivity to tank levels
380
In case of power shutdown, the transient behaviour of the system is determined by the amount of water stored in tanks. In order to better understand the relevance of each storage tank in the system, a sensitivity analysis has been performed. In particular, a sensitivity matrix is calculated by numerically computing the derivative of head of each node with respect on the level of each tank in a quasi-static assumption. By examining the resulting data, two types of tanks are identified, 
Conclusions
The impact of extreme weather events and natural disasters on urban structures and technological 395 infrastructures, also in the perspective of climate change, is causing a raising interest in citizens and institutions. In particular, the estimation of damage to network infrastructures poses an additional challenge due to the highly connected physical and functional topology, by which the detrimental effects spread to areas farther from the event location and lead to indirect losses.
In this work, a comprehensive methodology to assess the impact of a flood on a WSS is defined 400 and implemented in a semi-automated fashion. In particular, two main submodels are used: an (i) inundation model, which uses hydrometeorological data and a DTM to compute flood depth given the flood recurrence interval (hazard analysis), and a (ii) WSS hydraulic model, used to simulate fluiddynamic behaviour of the network from topology, functional and demand data. In the first place, a flood scenario is calculated by the inundation model, and water depths near the active WSS com- The described method is applied to a case study. The study area hosts about 380 000 inhabitants 415 on an area of 102 km 2 . The domestic water need -about 121 000 m 3 /day -is met by a WSS which abstracts the resource from the river Arno, which flows amidst the town. It is found that flood events with a recurrence intervals greater or equal to 100 years are those which affect functionality and safety of the WSS by causing power disruption to the main lifting station. Two failure scenarios are defined and analysed, considering zero or one pump in operation respectively. Inundation maps of 420 the area and service maps of the WDN are produced, thus identifying the most critical zones and the service disruption patterns in the two scenarios. Results show that providing a backup system to keep one of the pump in operation would largely reduce the affected population (by about 40%). As regards as the contamination of the pipeworks by floodwater, in the worst scenario it is estimated that 68 to 100% of the network undergoes backflow risk depending on event duration, whereas ter the event. The model is automated and lightweight, the analysis being completed in few minutes, and can be effectively used in the strategic planning of disaster recovery procedures or in comparing network strengthening solutions in budget allocation activities.
Future developments may include studying the effect of first-intervention procedures (e.g. subzon-
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ing of the network to select specific areas to be contaminated while preserving operation in others) and extending the model to simulate recovery procedures, so that recovery times and transient network behaviour can be estimated based on scheduling and available resources.
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